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 Objective Mens Rea and Attenuated 
Subjectivism: Guidance from Justice 
Charron in R. v. Beatty 
Palma Paciocco* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justin Ronald Beatty was driving on the Trans-Canada Highway 
on July 23, 2003 when, for no apparent reason, his truck suddenly 
crossed the solid centre line and collided with an oncoming car, killing 
three people. Beatty was charged with dangerous operation of a motor 
vehicle causing death. He was acquitted at trial on the grounds that his 
momentary lapse of attention was not enough to establish fault. The 
Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial after con-
cluding that the trial judge had misapplied the fault standard. Beatty 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which undertook to clarify the 
test for penal negligence.1 Writing for the majority, Charron J. expounded 
that test and restored Beatty’s acquittal. Her judgment offers cogent 
guidance on a thorny question in criminal law: when is a person crimi-
nally liable for causing harm he or she neither intends nor foresees? 
                                                                                                             
*  S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the organizers of, and participants in, 
the Symposium Celebrating the Contributions of Justice Louise Charron; to Graham Mayeda, Lisa 
Kelly and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; to 
Kenji Tokawa for careful editing; to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral 
Fellowship program for financial support during the period of this paper’s preparation; and to Justice 
Louise Charron, for whom I had the honour of clerking in 2010-2011, for her tremendous mentorship. 
1 Penal negligence is distinct from criminal negligence. Criminal negligence is a statutory 
offence (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 219). To make out criminal negligence, the Crown 
must prove, inter alia, that the accused’s act or omission “represented a marked and substantial 
departure (as opposed to a marked departure) from the conduct of a reasonably prudent [person] in 
circumstances where the accused either recognized and ran an obvious and serious risk … or, 
alternatively, gave no thought to that risk”: R. v. F. (J.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 62, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 215, 
at para. 9 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original). Penal negligence is the mens rea requirement for all other 
negligence-based offences. The standard for penal negligence is a marked departure from the 
standard of care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. The marked departure standard 
is discussed infra, notes 93-105 and accompanying text. 
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A core principle of Canadian criminal law is that a wrongful act does 
not suffice to establish criminal culpability; the accused must also pos-
sess a guilty mind. This principle is often expressed via the maxim actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: the act is not culpable unless the mind is 
guilty. Although this maxim is ubiquitous, it is hardly instructive, for it 
immediately begs the question what is a guilty mind?2 This question is so 
deeply contested and morally freighted as to seem intractable.3 Neverthe-
less, it remains critically important we address it. The guilty mind 
requirement is a key means by which we seek to ensure that only blame-
worthy people are held criminally liable. Our insistence that criminal 
liability be reserved for the blameworthy is at the core of our criminal 
justice culture. We believe criminal punishment is justified, and justifi-
ably stigmatizing, because we take it to accord with our broader moral 
judgments. Our beliefs about blameworthiness thus animate and validate 
the criminal justice system even as we continue to debate them.  
One of the most controversial aspects of the guilty mind question is 
the status of objective mens rea offences. The paradigmatic crime is a 
wrongful act accompanied by an overt mental state such as intent or 
recklessness.4 This type of crime — a subjective mens rea offence — can 
be contrasted with objective mens rea offences. The latter punish harmful 
acts that fall below objective standards of behaviour without regard 
to the defendant’s subjective mental state. Examples include dangerous 
operation of a motor vehicle, the negligence-based crime with which 
Beatty was charged.5 Canadian courts have generally upheld objective 
                                                                                                             
2 See, e.g., Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible 
Politics of Fault” (1992) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128, at 149 [hereinafter “Cairns Way, 
‘Politics of Fault’”], noting that the maxim is “singularly unhelpful as a unifying principle”. 
3 “Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy. … If the rationale or a 
limiting condition of criminal punishment is personal desert, then legal theory invariably 
interweaves with philosophical claims about wrongdoing, culpability, justifying circumstances and 
excuses”: George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1978), at xix. 
4 A person is reckless if she perceives that her intended actions will create a risk of harm 
but decides to proceed anyway. She does not intend to cause harm per se, but she deliberately risks 
it: R. v. Sansregret, [1985] S.C.J. No. 23, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.). Recklessness is also called 
“advertent negligence”. It is contrasted with inadvertent negligence, which, as in this paper, is often 
referred to simply as “negligence”. Whereas the reckless or advertently negligent person takes a risk 
she actually foresees, the negligent person takes a risk that is objectively foreseeable, but which she 
does not personally foresee. 
5 Recently, in R. v. H. (A.D.), [2013] S.C.J. No. 28, 2013 SCC 28 (S.C.C.), Cromwell J. 
identified “five main types of objective fault offences in the Code”: offences defined in terms of 
dangerous conduct (e.g., dangerous driving); those defined in terms of careless conduct (e.g., the 
careless storage of firearms); predicate offences, which punish harmful consequences in the absence 
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mens rea offences, but they remain controversial.6 Some theorists, “sub-
jectivists”, argue that only advertent conduct is blameworthy. They 
criticize objective mens rea offences for punishing inadvertent conduct.7 
Others, “contextualists”, delineate blameworthiness with reference to 
social expectations and harm. In their view, there is no prima facie prob-
lem with objective mens rea offences because it may be appropriate to 
punish a person whose inadvertent conduct falls below community stan-
dards and causes harm.8  
This paper intervenes in the subjectivism-contextualism debate by 
suggesting a new approach to conceptualizing blameworthiness, one that 
is reflected in Charron J.’s judgment in R. v. Beatty.9 I call this approach 
the “attenuated subjectivist approach”, and I contrast it with strict subjec-
tivism. Both types of subjectivism are grounded in the principle that an 
act or omission is only blameworthy if it reflects a choice on the part of 
the defendant. Whereas strict subjectivists maintain that only those who 
deliberately choose to commit prohibited acts or omissions are blame-
worthy, attenuated subjectivism rests on a more expansive notion of 
choice. In advancing the attenuated subjectivist approach, I maintain that 
people may be blamed for committing prohibited acts if those acts reflect 
their moral agency, and I assess whether acts reflect moral agency by 
asking whether the actors could and should have done otherwise. This 
assessment references social standards, but unlike the contextualist 
analysis, it retains a primary focus on the defendant’s exercise of choice. 
I conclude that some objective mens rea offences are justified because 
some negligent actions reflect moral agency.  
The attenuated subjectivist approach is admittedly of limited 
assistance in assessing the fault requirements for particular offences 
because it begs the key normative question: when is it fair to say 
someone should have acted differently? To answer this question, we must 
adopt criteria for assessing blameworthiness. The tort law standard of 
care is of no direct assistance here because it is not sufficiently restricted 
to ensure that only the morally blameworthy are criminally punished; the 
                                                                                                             
of subjective foresight of harm; offences based on criminal negligence (i.e., the statutory offence of 
criminal negligence; see supra, note 1); and duty-based offences (e.g., failing to provide the 
necessaries of life). 
6 The scholarly debates about objective mens rea are discussed at infra, Part II; the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the issue is discussed at infra, Part III.  
7 See infra, Part II.1. 
8 See, infra, Part II.2. 
9 [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Beatty”]. 
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claim that someone “should” have acted differently has far heavier 
normative implications in the criminal context than in the tort context.10 
Nor can we simply import notions about moral blameworthiness from 
outside the law. These are too contested to serve as stable legal criteria. So 
while the attenuated subjectivist approach homes in on the key question, it 
leaves it open. 
The approach does, however, apply readily to objective mens rea of-
fences in one context, that of licensed activities. It is fair to presume 
people who perform licensed activities can and should meet the requisite 
standard of care. Justice Charron articulates the rationale for this pre-
sumption in Beatty. She explains that people who engage in licensed 
activities are presumptively aware of the standard of care and capable of 
meeting it. They presumptively can meet the standard. They are, more-
over, on notice that the standard will be enforced, having agreed to abide 
by it when they chose to undertake the voluntary licensed activity. We 
can therefore presumptively claim they should meet the standard without 
triggering debates about moral blameworthiness. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II introduces subjectivism and 
contextualism. Part III provides a very brief overview of the Court’s juris-
prudence on objective and subjective mens rea leading up to Beatty. This 
jurisprudence is not entirely consistent with either subjectivism or contex-
tualism. The Court has endorsed subjectivist principles and enshrined 
some of them as section 7 principles of fundamental justice,11 yet it has 
also endorsed numerous objective mens rea offences and has resisted con-
stitutionalizing subjectivism in general. This paper does not aim to 
reconcile all of the Court’s mens rea decisions, though Part III does exam-
ine a common explanation for their trajectory. Part III is intended to 
provide background while highlighting how salient the objective mens rea 
debate remains today. Part IV introduces and defends the attenuated sub-
jectivist approach. Part V completes the analysis through a close reading of 
Charron J.’s reasons in Beatty. Those reasons clarified the test for penal 
negligence by casting it in attenuated subjectivist terms.  
                                                                                                             
10 See text accompanying, infra, note 96. 
11 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Section 7 of the 
Charter states, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
(2014), 65 S.C.L.R. (2d) OBJECTIVE MENS REA AND ATTENUATED SUBJECTIVISM 83 
II. SUBJECTIVISM AND CONTEXTUALISM 
Scholars and jurists have long debated the appropriateness of objec-
tive mens rea offences.12 In large measure, the debate turns on competing 
understandings of blameworthiness. Subjectivists view moral blamewor-
thiness as a necessary (though insufficient) condition for criminal guilt, 
and they believe conduct is not morally blameworthy unless engaged in 
freely and consciously.13 They therefore think criminal liability should be 
reserved for those who consciously choose to perform prohibited acts.14 
Contextualists assess blameworthiness in light of social standards and 
harmful outcomes.15 From their perspective, it may be appropriate to 
criminally punish those who unintentionally cause harm by falling below 
social expectations.  
1. Subjectivism 
Subjectivism reflects a classically liberal understanding of the state’s 
relationship with individuals.16 According to this line of thought, the state 
should maximize individual autonomy by reserving criminal sanctions 
for those who choose to commit unlawful acts. Subjectivists regard mens 
rea doctrines as a key means of enforcing this limitation on the criminal 
                                                                                                             
12 See, e.g., Albert Lévitt, “Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea” (1923) 17 Ill. L. 
Rev. 578; Francie Bowes Sayre, “Mens Rea” (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974; Barbara Wootton, Crime 
and the Criminal Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1963); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Hart”]; 
George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
13 See, e.g., Hart, id.; Kent Roach, “Mind the Gap: Canada’s Different Criminal and 
Constitutional Standards of Fault” (2011) 61 U.T.L.J. 545, at 575 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Different 
Standards of Fault’”], David M. Paciocco, “Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences 
and Defences” (1995) 59 Sask. L. Rev. 271, at 309 (now Justice David M. Paciocco, Ontario Court 
of Justice) [hereinafter “Paciocco, ‘Subjective and Objective Standards’”]. 
14 Brian Rolfes, “The Golden Thread of Criminal Law – Moral Culpability and Sexual 
Assault” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 87, at para. 28 [hereinafter “Rolfes”]. See also Alan Brudner, “Guilt 
under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentary Supremacy” (1998) 40 Crim. L.Q. 287, at 317, presenting 
a somewhat different criticism of negligence-based criminal offences. In Brudner’s view, these offences 
are “morally problematic” because “punishment is justified in a free society only in the exceptional case 
where the individual has himself willed it through a wilful denial of the rights of personality, for in that 
case alone do we honour the autonomy of the person in the very act of taking it away”. 
15 See, e.g., James Stribopoulos, “The Constitutionalization of ‘Fault’ in Canada: A 
Normative Critique” (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 227 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos”]; Cairns Way, “Politics 
of Fault”, supra, note 2; Rosemary Cairns Way, “Culpability and the Equality Value: The Legacy of 
the Martineau Dissent” (2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 53 [hereinafter “Cairns Way, ‘Culpability’”]. 
16 Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, id., at 134 (identifying and criticizing subjectivism’s 
liberal premises). 
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law power. According to H.L.A. Hart, mens rea doctrines “[respect] the 
claims of the individual as such, or at least as a choosing being, and dis-
tribute [the law’s] coercive sanctions in a way that reflects this respect 
for the individual. This surely is very central in the notion of justice 
…”.17 Subjectivists express concern that without rigorous mens rea doc-
trines, the state might punish individuals for actions that, while 
dangerous, do not reflect a conscious choice to cause or risk harm.18 
Because subjectivists are concerned about state overreach, they are 
suspicious of legal analyses that use policy goals to identify the mens rea 
requirements for particular offences (e.g., an analysis that says proof of 
penal negligence suffices to establish dangerous driving because road 
safety is a pressing issue19). They believe this type of analysis risks 
criminalizing behaviour that is potentially injurious but morally blame-
less.20 They therefore favour systematic analyses that deduce particular 
mens rea requirements from abstract fault principles, rather than extrapo-
lating them from policy considerations.  
Finally, because subjectivists are partial to abstract analyses and are 
concerned about state overreach, they tend to favour a strong judicial role 
in determining mens rea requirements. In their view, the courts are best 
placed to support subjective mens rea principles and to restrain overzeal-
ous legislators who, for their part, have an illiberal tendency to 
criminalize dangerous behaviour with insufficient regard to individual 
desert.21 Subjectivists therefore encourage courts to actively shape mens 
rea standards. 
                                                                                                             
17 Hart, supra, note 12, at 49 (emphasis in original). 
18 See, e.g., Don R. Stuart, “The Need to Codify Clear, Realistic and Honest Measures of 
Mens Rea and Negligence” (1972) 15 Crim. L.Q. 160, at 183: “Above all, the concept of mens rea 
must be retained as a civil libertarian tool available for the lawyer to use to fend off society’s 
assertion that the accused be formally controlled and punished.” 
19 Justice Cory deployed this argument, among others, in R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, at 884 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hundal”]. 
20 See, e.g., Alan N. Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum 
Content of Criminal Law” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 441 [hereinafter “Young”]; and Paciocco, 
“Subjective and Objective Standards”, supra, note 13. One can subscribe to this perspective while 
also recognizing a key limitation of liberalism: its focus on individual choice, conceptualized in the 
abstract, tends to obscure socio-economic factors that give some individuals a much larger array of 
options than others. One can believe that an exercise of individual choice should be a necessary 
condition for imposing criminal liability while also maintaining that broad structural changes are 
necessary to maximize equal access to options. 
21 See, e.g., Young, id., at 442: “The conventional wisdom that courts cannot second-guess 
the policy choices made by a legislature rings hollow in a day and age when resort to criminal law as 
a response to a perceived social problem has become routine and perfunctory.” See also Kent Roach, 
“Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian 
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2. Contextualism 
Contextualists resist the subjectivist emphasis on individual intent 
and focus instead on community standards.22 James Stribopoulos, for 
example, writes:  
If a person causes harm, in circumstances under which any reasonable 
member of the community would have realized that harm was a likely 
consequence of the conduct, it is not the presence or absence of choice 
which is relevant to blameworthiness. It is the failure to conduct oneself 
in a fashion commensurate with ordinary community expectations which 
transforms the conduct from something neutral, to something deserving 
of condemnation.23  
In the same vein, Rosemary Cairns Way encourages us to zoom out from 
a narrow focus on the defendant’s experience to consider the victim’s 
perspective as well as community attitudes about the act or omission in 
question.24  
Contextualists place a lower value on logical consistency than their 
subjectivist counterparts and a greater premium on context-sensitivity. 
They favour an inductive, case-by-case approach to determine the mens 
rea requirements for particular offences, one that looks to the specific 
context and purpose of each crime. Cairns Way, for example, criticizes 
the majority position in R. v. Martineau for 
assum[ing] that the development of an overarching theory is desirable 
and necessary, that the fairest way to measure responsibility is to apply 
generalized rules to particular situations, and that logical consistency 
and analytic clarity are preeminent values.25  
She praises L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent for resisting “formulaic reasoning” 
in favour of a more comprehensive, contextualized, and multifaceted fault 
                                                                                                             
Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481, at 512 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Dialogues’”], discussing the 
different concerns of courts and legislatures vis-à-vis criminal law and advocating for a balanced 
“dialogue” approach. 
22 Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2, at 178. 
23 Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 270-71. 
24 Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2; Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15. 
See also Dennis Klinck, “The Charter and Substantive Criminal ‘Justice’” (1993) 42 U.N.B.L.J. 
191, at 211, suggesting that “an adequate account of justice might require a much more subtle and 
far-reaching inquiry into the social contexts of criminality than a narrowly focused attempt to equate 
moral blameworthiness, (defined in terms of subjective awareness), with penal, (or other), 
consequences for the accused”. 
25 Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15, at 62. 
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analysis.26 Similarly, Nancy Thomson approves of Wilson J.’s concurring 
reasons in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), 
which frame the fault requirement in a context-specific manner.27  
Contra the subjectivists, Thomson warns us that abstract fault analy-
ses risk “overstat[ing] principles in an effort to settle the issue”, thereby 
generating skewed standards and foreclosing ongoing analysis.28 Contex-
tualists value ongoing analysis because they figure blameworthiness as a 
contingent, evolving concept. For the same reason, they believe judges 
should assume a limited role in determining mens rea standards so as to 
enable legislative experimentation.29 
The foregoing descriptions of subjectivism and contextualism are 
simplistic, but they suffice to frame the discussion. Not all scholars and 
jurists are rigid subjectivists or objectivists. For example, some scholars 
endorse the subjectivist account of blameworthiness but nevertheless 
accept certain objective mens rea offences.30 The same is true of the  
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, to which I now turn. 
III. THE COURT’S PRE-BEATTY JURISPRUDENCE ON  
OBJECTIVE MENS REA 
The Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions bearing on 
objective mens rea. This section provides a brief overview of the key 
cases leading up to Beatty, then offers an explanation for their surprising 
trajectory. 
                                                                                                             
26 Id. 
27 Nancy K. Thomson, “Fundamental Justice, Stigma and Fault” (1994) 52 U.T. Fac. L. 
Rev. 379, at 384. Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
28 Id., at 386. 
29 See especially Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2, at 145 and 176. See also 
Roach, “Dialogues”, supra, note 21, at 512, noting that although judges are institutionally well 
positioned to consider fault, “fault is a contested and evolving concept and it is not clear that courts 
should impose the final word on legislatures on these matters”. Roach favours institutional dialogue 
to balance these considerations. 
30 See, e.g., Donald Galloway, “Why the Criminal Law is Irrational” (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 25 
[hereinafter “Galloway”] and Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13, at 575, noting 
that if objective mens rea offences were presumptively unconstitutional but were subject to a section 
1 balancing analysis, the government could likely “justify the use of negligence in connection with 
manslaughter and the use of constructive liability for aggravated forms of impaired and dangerous 
driving. It might also have been able to justify blended forms of subjective and objective fault with 
respect to sexual assault and corporate crime”. 
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1. Major Supreme Court Decisions on Objective and Subjective 
Mens Rea 
Not long before the Charter was enacted, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), 
Dickson J. (as he then was), writing for the Court, penned the “most well-
known subjectivist statement about mens rea and true crime in Canadian 
law”.31 He wrote: “Within the context of a criminal prosecution a person 
who fails to make such enquiries as a reasonable and prudent person would 
make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is innocent in the 
eyes of the law.”32 He affirmed the statutory presumption that true crimes 
require proof of subjective mens rea33 and established a further presumption 
that regulatory offences admit of a due diligence defence.34 Justice Charron 
later characterized these presumptions as “presumptive principles of crimi-
nal justice”.35  
The Court demonstrated a strong commitment to subjectivism in the 
decade the Charter was enacted. In R. v. Pappajohn, the majority con-
cluded the defendant in a rape case could be acquitted if he honestly 
believed the complainant was consenting, even if his belief was unrea-
sonable.36 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, Lamer J. (as he then 
                                                                                                             
31 Paciocco, “Subjective and Objective Standards”, supra, note 13, at 274. Paciocco goes on 
to remark, “[i]t is debatable whether the classic passage from Sault Ste. Marie was ever accurate in 
its suggestion that criminal liability requires subjective fault. We have consistently found clever 
ways to criminalize the unthinking” (id., at 275). R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sault Ste. Marie”]. 
32 Sault Ste. Marie, id., at 1309-10 (S.C.R.). 
33 The presumption that true crimes require proof of subjective mens rea had already been 
articulated in earlier cases. See R. v. Beaver, [1957] S.C.J. No. 32, [1957] S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.); and 
Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 (Div. Ct.). See also R. v. Pierce Fisheries, [1970] S.C.J. 
No. 58, [1971] S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.), holding that the presumption does not apply to regulatory offences. 
34 True crimes require proof of mens rea whereas regulatory offences do not. Because this 
paper is concerned with mens rea, its focus is on true crimes. Regulatory offences are divided into 
strict liability offences, which admit of a due diligence defence, and absolute liability offences, 
which do not. Thus, Sault Ste. Marie in effect established a statutory presumption that regulatory 
offences are strict liability offences, not absolute liability offences: Sault Ste. Marie, supra, note 31, 
at 1325-36. The due diligence defence applies when the accused “establishes, on a balance of 
probabilities ... that he or she took reasonable care or made a reasonable mistake”: Richard 
Litkowski, “The Charter and the Principles of Criminal Responsibility: A Long and Winding Road” 
[hereinafter “Litkowski”] in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice 
System (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 1996) 271, at 271.  
35 Beatty, supra, note 9, at para. 22. Justice Charron notes that before the Charter was 
enacted, courts charged with assessing mens rea requirements could only police the division of 
powers and interpret provisions in light of these presumptive principles: id. 
36 R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] S.C.J. No. 51, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.). The 
unreasonableness of the putative belief in consent could, however, serve as evidence the belief was 
not honestly held. The Court later clarified the defence is not available where the accused was 
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was), for the majority, held that absolute liability offences involving the 
possibility of imprisonment contravene section 7 of the Charter.37 Writ-
ing for the majority again in R. v. Vaillancourt, he announced that “there 
is, as a principle of fundamental justice, a minimum mental state which is 
an essential element of the offence” and that a small number of criminal 
offences, including murder, require “a mens rea reflecting [their] particu-
lar nature” to justify their heightened penalties and stigma.38 Three years 
later, in R. v. Martineau, Lamer C.J.C. established the minimum mens rea 
requirement for murder: “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective 
foresight of death”.39 Martineau “represents the apotheosis of subjectiv-
ism as a constitutional norm”.40 After these decisions, many anticipated 
the Court would entrench constitutional subjective mens rea require-
ments for numerous other offences.41 It did not.42 
In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, the Court held the mens 
rea for any offence “may be demonstrated by proof of intent, whether 
subjective or objective, or by proof of negligent conduct, depending on 
the nature of the offence”.43 In R. v. DeSousa, it found the accused need 
not actually intend the consequences of an “otherwise blameworthy 
act”.44 These cases made it clear that an objective mens rea standard is 
constitutionally sufficient for most crimes45 but left open the question of 
how that standard should be formulated.46  
The Court soon addressed this question in R. v. Hundal, wherein  
it held that the mens rea standard for dangerous driving is a marked 
                                                                                                             
wilfully blind to the lack of consent: R. v. Sansregret, [1985] S.C.J. No. 23, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 
(S.C.C.). In addition, contra R. v. Pappajohn, the Criminal Code now conditions the mistaken belief 
in consent defence on the accused having taken reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant was 
consenting: Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 273.2. 
37 B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27. 
38 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652-53 (S.C.C.). 
39 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 646 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martineau”]. 
40 Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15, at 59. 
41 Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 251; Litkowski, supra, note 34, at 275. 
42 Stribopoulos, id. 
43 [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at 659 (S.C.C.), quoting R. v. Wholesale 
Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. Here, “nature of 
the offence” refers to the distinction between true crimes and regulatory offences established in Sault Ste. 
Marie, supra, note 31. See infra, note 45. Proof of negligent conduct suffices for regulatory 
offences, whereas proof of subjective or objective intent is required for true crimes.  
44 [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at 967 (S.C.C.). 
45 Don Stuart, “The Supreme Court Drastically Reduces the Constitutional Requirement of 
Fault: A Triumph of Pragmatism and Law Enforcement Expediency” (1992) 215 C.R. (4th) 88, at 92.  
46 Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 279. 
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departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.47 Justice Cory, 
writing for the majority, added: “The potential harshness of the objective 
standard may be lessened by the consideration of certain personal factors” 
that may negate fault, such as an unexpected seizure, heart attack, or 
detached retina.48 He described this test as a “modified objective test”.49  
A few months after Hundal, McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for a 
bare majority in R. v. Creighton and its three companion cases, affirmed 
the modified objective test.50 She held, further, that the accused’s level of 
ability and experience is irrelevant to the test, but added the caveat that 
the accused must be acquitted if he or she is incapable of meeting 
the standard of care.51 The modified objective test is considered in more 
detail in Part V. 
By fully entrenching the modified objective test, Creighton and its 
companion cases confirmed the Court’s retreat from the strong subjectivism 
expressed in Sault Ste. Marie. As Cairns Way puts it, “[n]either the promise 
nor the peril, depending on your point of view, of the [Court’s early] consti-
tutional decisions have materialized”.52 Yet, while the Court has not 
adhered to strong subjectivism, neither has it embraced contextualism. It 
has maintained the core subjectivist principle that blameworthiness is pri-
marily a function of the accused’s mental state while nevertheless accepting 
an objective mens rea standard for many crimes. This seemingly inconsis-
tent approach has attracted much scholarly attention. 
                                                                                                             
47 Hundal, supra, note 19. 
48 Id., at 883. In her concurring reasons, McLachlin J. (as she then was) noted that someone 
who drives in a dangerous manner while having a seizure, or after losing consciousness due to a 
heart attack, lacks the voluntariness necessary to establish the actus reus. It should therefore be 
unnecessary to consider the mens rea element at all: id., at 875-76. I think Cory J.’s detached retina 
example is more apposite, since a person with a detached retina retains voluntary control over her 
movements, although McLachlin J. would frame the detached retina example in terms of 
involuntariness, too. She writes: “The better analysis, in my view, is that the onset of a ‘disease or 
disability’ makes the act of losing control of the motor vehicle involuntary, with the result that there 
is no actus reus”: id., at 875. 
49 Id., at 887. 
50 R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Creighton”]. Creighton’s three companion cases are R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993] 
3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.); R. v. Naglik, [1993] S.C.J. No. 92, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.); and R. v. 
Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
51 Creighton, id., at 60-61: “I agree with the Chief Justice that the rule that the morally 
innocent not be punished in the context of the objective test requires that the law refrain from 
holding a person criminally responsible if he or she is not capable of appreciating the risk.”  
52 Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15, at 55. 
90 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 65 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
2. Subjectivism and the Limits of Section 7 
Many criminal law scholars have concluded the Court is unwilling to 
establish a general subjective fault requirement under section 7, despite 
endorsing subjectivist principles, because it does not want to invalidate 
all the objective mens rea offences in the Criminal Code, some of which 
are widely accepted and regarded as important for public safety.53 In the-
ory, the Court could constitutionalize subjectivism under section 7, then 
use the section 1 balancing analysis to salvage some objective mens rea 
offences. In practice, however, it has never applied section 1 to section 7 
and has “expressed doubt about whether a violation of the right to life, 
liberty or security of the person which is not in accordance with the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice can ever be justified, except perhaps in 
times of war or national emergencies”.54 As Kent Roach points out, con-
stitutionalizing subjectivism would therefore mean either doing away 
with all objective mens rea offences or fundamentally reconceptualizing 
section 7 to make section 1 readily applicable.55 
Roach claims that “subjective fault is a sufficiently compelling and 
traditional standard of culpability that it should have been constitutional-
ized as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7”.56 He notes 
that subjectivist principles have a strong pedigree in Anglo-American 
criminal law, cohere with widely shared intuitions about blameworthi-
ness, and fit best with most punishment theories.57 He argues, further, 
that the section 1 balancing analysis should be more readily applied to 
section 7, and that some objective mens rea offences could be justified 
on this basis.58 I agree, though I will not recapitulate Roach’s arguments 
                                                                                                             
53 See, e.g., Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 272; David M. Paciocco, Book Review of The 
Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System, Jamie Cameron, ed. (1997) 28 Ottawa L. Rev. 
249; Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008) 40 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 553, at 569; and Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13. 
54 R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 802 (S.C.C.), citing B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at 518. See also Thomas Lipton, “All Charter Rights are 
Equal, But Some are More Equal Than Others” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 449, at 461-62; and Roach, 
“Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13, at 570-71. 
55 Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, id. 
56 Id., at 548. 
57 Id., at 566. With respect to punishment theories, Roach notes: “A person who was not 
aware of the harm that he or she caused or the risk that he or she ran cannot easily be blamed or 
deterred by the use of the criminal sanction. Such persons also cannot meaningfully acknowledge 
personal responsibility for the harm that they inadvertently caused”: id. Thus, objective mens rea 
crimes are not easily reconciled with specific deterrence, retributive justice or restorative justice.  
58 Roach suggests the government could likely justify some objective mens rea offences 
such as manslaughter and “aggravated forms of impaired and dangerous driving” under section 1, as 
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here. Unlike Roach, however, I think that even if subjectivism were con-
stitutionalized under section 7, a limited number of objective mens rea 
offences could be endorsed without recourse to section 1. To explain 
why, I will contrast strict subjectivism, to which Roach subscribes, with 
what I am calling attenuated subjectivism. But first, I will attempt to 
build on Roach’s defence of subjectivism in general.  
IV. ATTENUATED SUBJECTIVISM 
1. The Case for Subjectivism 
As we shall see, strict and attenuated subjectivists share the belief 
that blameworthiness is chiefly about the actor’s mental state; indeed, 
this belief is what distinguishes them from contextualists.59 Their shared 
focus on the actor’s mental state is intuitive and familiar. When a toddler 
colours on the wallpaper, we may scold her but we do not blame her in 
the way we would blame an adult vandal. We understand she is to blame in 
the causal sense (i.e., in the sense high wind is to blame for a felled tree) 
but not in the moral or legal sense. The same principle is captured by the 
criminal law’s capacity requirement, which makes criminal liability con-
tingent on the defendant’s ability to understand her actions. We do not 
criminally punish someone who uttered threats as a symptom of her men-
tal disorder for the same reason we do not view the toddler as 
blameworthy: we recognize that neither individual truly understood what 
she was doing, and hence neither made a meaningful choice to commit 
the proscribed act.  
The close relationship between choice and blameworthiness (and 
hence, between choice and criminal liability) is reflected in numerous 
                                                                                                             
well as “some blended forms of subjective and objective fault with respect to sexual assault and 
corporate crime”: id., at 575. 
59 Contextualists regard blameworthiness as a function of mental state, but not exclusively 
or even primarily so, inasmuch as they accept the capacity requirement. That requirement conditions 
criminal liability on a minimum level of subjective awareness. In this regard, we can contrast 
contextualists with consequentialists. According to consequentialists, acts are morally right or wrong 
to the extent that they maximize, or fail to maximize, favourable outcomes. Because punishment is 
likewise morally justified to the extent that it maximizes favourable outcomes, we ought only to 
punish an individual if doing so will maximize favourable outcomes by deterring other harmful acts. 
Mental state is irrelevant. See David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, “Bringing Character Back: 
How the Motivation to Evaluate Character Influences Judgments of Moral Blame” in Mario 
Mikulincer & Philip R. Shaver, eds., The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of 
Good and Evil (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2012).  
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criminal law doctrines apart from capacity. It underpins the voluntariness 
requirement. A person who strikes another during a seizure or while 
sleepwalking is not criminally responsible for her actions because she did 
not choose to perform them. Again, she can only be blamed in the causal 
sense.60 
Choice also animates the excuses of duress and necessity. In R. v. 
Ryan, the Court recalled that duress and necessity are based on the notion 
of “normative involuntariness” and clarified that an act is normatively 
involuntary if the actor has “no realistic choice”.61 In R. v. Perka, Dickson J. 
(as he then was) explained: “At the heart of [the necessity] defence is the 
perceived injustice of punishing violations of the law in circumstances in 
which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available.”62  
The defence of mistake of fact reflects a similar logic. “If an accused 
entertains an honest belief in the existence of a set of circumstances 
which, if they existed at the time of the commission of an otherwise 
criminal act, would have justified his act and rendered it non-criminal, he 
is entitled to an acquittal.”63 Blackstone categorized mistake of fact as a 
“defect of will”.64 In light of the mistake of fact, the accused did 
not choose to perform the prohibited act in the sense of willing it or its 
consequences; she thought she was doing something else. Her actions 
therefore do not reflect her moral agency.  
In short, the capacity and voluntariness requirements, the necessity 
and duress excuses, and the mistake of fact defence all apply two widely 
accepted principles: an action should not be punished unless it reflects 
moral agency; and an action does not reflect moral agency unless it ex-
presses the actor’s will. The same principles also animate subjectivism, 
which is thus uniquely compatible with these criminal law doctrines. 
Subjectivism also serves the main purpose of the Criminal Code, 
which, as Donald Galloway notes, is to set out imperatives people are 
expected to follow.65 Daniel Robinson explains that the law must require 
                                                                                                             
60 R. v. Parks, [1992] S.C.J. No. 71, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 (S.C.C.). 
61 [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3, at para. 17 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J. 
No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, at paras. 54 and 40 (S.C.C.): “it is a violation of s. 7 of the Charter to 
convict a person who has no realistic choice and whose behaviour is, therefore, morally involuntary” 
(emphasis added). 
62 [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 234 (S.C.C.), quoted with approval in R. v. 
Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). 
63 R. v. Bulmer, [1987] S.C.J. No. 28, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 782, at 789 (S.C.C.).  
64 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), at 27. 
65 Galloway, supra, note 30, at 26. 
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or prohibit that which “could be otherwise” since laws requiring the in-
evitable, or prohibiting the impossible, would be inane.66 Laws should 
address “just those events over which persons have controlling powers 
subject to their choices, decisions, volitions” — events that can be attrib-
uted to their moral agency.67 If a criminal law required or prohibited an 
act that is not a function of moral agency, we could not fairly expect peo-
ple to follow it and hence it would be incompatible with the core purpose 
of the Criminal Code. By linking criminal liability to choice, subjectiv-
ism serves the main purpose of the Criminal Code, ensuring that the 
criminal law only sets out imperatives people can be expected to follow. 
For this reason, and also because it fits well with numerous criminal law 
doctrines and with common intuitions about blameworthiness, subjectiv-
ism is a sound and viable theory of fault. 
2. Strict Subjectivism versus Attenuated Subjectivism 
I turn at last to the difference between strict and attenuated subjectiv-
ism. Galloway observes that there are, broadly speaking, three mental 
states vis-à-vis harmful acts: those of a person who cannot choose to 
avoid harm; a person who chooses to do harm; and a person who neither 
chooses to avoid harm nor chooses to do harm.68 People in the latter 
category are “oblivious to the possibility of harm because of a failure to 
predict, remember, or think about what [they are] doing”.69 These three 
mental states map onto the criminal law categories of involuntariness and 
incapacity; intent and recklessness; and inadvertent negligence. They also 
help to clarify the difference between strict and attenuated subjectivism. 
Someone who lacks voluntariness or capacity cannot choose to avoid 
harm. Strict and attenuated subjectivists agree she should not be 
criminally punished. Someone who acts intentionally or recklessly 
thereby chooses to do harm. Strict and attenuated subjectivists agree she 
may be criminally punished. These points of agreement reflect the shared 
focus on choice discussed above. Finally, someone who acts negligently 
                                                                                                             
66 Daniel N. Robinson, “Madness, Badness, and Fitness: Law and Psychiatry (Again)” 
(2000) 7:3 Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 209, at 210 (emphasis in original). 
67 Id., at 210. See also Benjamin Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in 
the Criminal Law” in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal 
Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and 
International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), at 117. 
68 Galloway, supra, note 30, at 29-30. 
69 Id., at 30. 
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neither chooses to avoid harm nor chooses to do harm. Strict and 
attenuated subjectivists disagree about her status. Their disagreement is 
premised on two different understandings of “choice”. 
The competing understandings of choice are captured by the follow-
ing two statements: (A) “we ought only to hold a person criminally liable 
if we conclude, inter alia, that she deliberately chose to perform a harm-
ful act” (where “deliberately chose” implies both an explicit choice and 
moral voluntariness, i.e., an advertent choice among acceptable alterna-
tives); and (B) “we ought only to hold a person criminally liable if we 
conclude, inter alia, that she could and should have acted differently”. 
I will say more about how we might determine whether someone could 
and should have acted differently below.  
Strict subjectivists subscribe to statement A, which insists on a delib-
erate choice as a condition for blameworthiness. As such, they assign 
blame in cases of intent or recklessness but not negligence. Attenuated 
subjectivists subscribe to statement B, which insists on a choice in the 
looser sense of exercising an option. Statement B is underpinned by the 
familiar edict, “ought implies can”. When we say someone could and 
should have acted differently, we thereby imply she had the option to act 
differently — we imply she had a choice. Indeed, we would reject the 
claim that she “had no choice”. Because attenuated subjectivists do not 
insist on an advertent choice, they may assign blame in cases of intent, 
recklessness or negligence. In Galloway’s terms, they may endorse 
criminal liability for someone who neither chooses to avoid harm nor 
chooses to do harm. In the remainder of this section, I will explain why 
I think this approach is preferable. 
3. The Case for Attenuated Subjectivism  
We have just seen that the key theoretical difference between strict 
and attenuated subjectivism is the former’s insistence on deliberate 
choice. What might justify this insistence?  
I think the strongest argument in its favour relates to the liberal 
principle that people should have a genuine opportunity to purposefully 
avoid criminal sanctions by complying with the law. When we punish an 
individual for taking a risk she does not actually perceive, we thereby 
punish her for failing to make the choice that someone operating on a 
different set of premises ought to have made. Punishment is arguably 
unfair in these circumstances. Indeed, the House of Lords recently 
(2014), 65 S.C.L.R. (2d) OBJECTIVE MENS REA AND ATTENUATED SUBJECTIVISM 95 
remarked that “[i]t is neither moral nor just to convict a defendant … on 
the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if the 
defendant himself had no such apprehension”.70  
This argument, though compelling at first blush, is premised on an 
unduly narrow view of what constitutes a genuine opportunity to comply 
with the law. It presumes people do not have such an opportunity unless 
they make a conscious choice to perform or forgo a prohibited act. It is 
equally plausible, however, to claim people have a genuine opportunity 
to comply with the law when they have both the capacity to comply and 
a fair chance to do so. Hart takes this position, stating: “What is crucial is 
that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the nor-
mal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and 
abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise 
these capacities.”71 Where these conditions are met, a person has a genu-
ine opportunity to comply with the law. If she fails to recognize that 
opportunity because of carelessness or inattention, her failure can be at-
tributed to her moral agency; it does not disprove the existence of the fair 
opportunity.  
This account of when someone has a genuine opportunity to comply 
with the law accords with widely held intuitions about blameworthiness. 
Galloway writes that “[t]o limit accountability to the results of conscious 
choice on the basis of respect for individual autonomy is to ignore a 
host of widely recognized blameworthy attitudes which we deem to be 
within the control of an individual” such as laziness, forgetfulness and 
obliviousness.72 Galloway asks us to compare an individual who misses 
an appointment because he is unconscious in the hospital with one who 
misses an appointment because he forgets.73 We blame the forgetful per-
son but not the unconscious one, even though neither made a deliberate 
choice to be truant. In the same vein, most people would not say an 
oblivious hunter is blameless because she “just didn’t think” when she 
fired on a populated campsite, or that a careless driver is blameless be-
cause she was not paying attention.  
                                                                                                             
70 R. v. G, [2003] UKHL 50, at para. 33, 167 J.P. 621 (H.L.). 
71 Hart, supra, note 12, at 152. 
72 Galloway, supra, note 30, at 30. See also Hart, id., at 151-52, noting that “a hundred 
times a day persons are blamed outside the law courts for not being more careful, for being 
inattentive and not stopping to think”. 
73 Galloway, id., at 30. 
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Alan Brudner’s account of moral agency and negligence helps illu-
minate our moral intuitions about the truants, the hunter and the driver.74 
Brudner explains that when a person causes an unlawful outcome, that 
outcome can be attributed in whole or in part to her agency, as distinct 
from chance.75 An outcome that is intentionally produced is fully attrib-
utable to agency, whereas a negligently produced outcome can be 
imputed in some measure to chance.76 The degree to which an outcome 
can be attributed to agency is a stable, objective criterion for assessing 
blameworthiness: an act is more blameworthy to the extent that it can be 
attributed to agency.77 Thus, a negligent actor is blameworthy, albeit less 
so than one who acts with intent.78 On this account, we blame the forget-
ful truant, the oblivious hunter and the careless driver because we believe 
the outcomes of their actions can be attributed, in part, to their agency. In 
other words, we believe they had the capacity and the fair opportunity to 
act differently. This account of agency is intuitively compelling and is 
accepted within Canadian law.79 
The attenuated subjectivist approach is aligned with the foregoing 
account of agency and blameworthiness. In contrast, as Galloway notes, 
the strict subjectivist approach “cannot be rationally premised upon any 
principle of fairness that is entrenched within our culture”.80 Our com-
mon notions of fairness do not require us to withhold judgment against 
the careless, clumsy or impetuous; to the contrary, we recognize that 
these characteristics reflect moral agency.  
Of course, the fact that we regard a person as morally blameworthy 
is not, in itself, enough to justify criminal punishment. Recall that from 
the subjectivist perspective, moral blameworthiness is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for criminal liability. For the purposes of this pa-
per, I will not attempt a complete account of the sufficient conditions for 
criminal liability. I wish merely to make the following argument. Subjec-
tivists in both camps agree that a defendant should not be convicted 
                                                                                                             
74 Alan Brudner, “Proportionality, Stigma and Discretion” (1996) 38 Crim. L.Q. 302. 
75 Id., at 309. 
76 Id., at 309-10. 
77 Id., at 309. 
78 Id., at 309-10. 
79 See especially, Martineau, supra, note 39, at 645, endorsing “the principle that 
punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender, or as Professor Hart 
puts it in Punishment and Responsibility (1968), at 162, the fundamental principle of a morally based 
system of law that those causing harm intentionally be punished more severely than those causing 
harm unintentionally”.  
80 Galloway, supra, note 30, at 31. 
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unless she had a genuine opportunity to comply with the law. Again, 
strict subjectivists believe such an opportunity only exists where a defen-
dant makes a deliberate choice to commit or avoid a prohibited act or 
omission. This strict subjectivist claim is belied, however, by the claim 
that inadvertent acts and omissions can reflect moral agency, a claim that 
is supported by our intuitive responses to the forgetful truant, the oblivi-
ous hunter and the careless driver. Contra strict subjectivism, then, the 
principle that defendants must have a genuine opportunity to comply 
with the law does not entail a deliberate choice requirement. 
Recall, moreover, that the subjectivist insistence on a genuine oppor-
tunity to comply with the law is premised on the liberal values of 
individual choice and respect for autonomy. When we consider these 
values in light of Galloway’s argument, we see that they are more consis-
tent with the attenuated subjectivist view than with its strict subjectivist 
counterpart. When we say a person did not have the opportunity to avoid 
a risk, we thereby imply she was incapable of avoiding it. In some cases, 
of course, she is incapable, in which case attenuated and strict subjectiv-
ists agree she should not be held criminally liable. If she is capable of 
avoiding the risk, however, then respect for her agency requires us to 
recognize the full scope of her capacities — including her capacities to 
pay attention, predict and reason — by holding her accountable for her 
failure to avoid it.81 In this light, the attenuated subjectivist approach’s 
conception of moral agency is more consistent with liberalism’s respect 
for individuals. The attenuated subjectivist approach therefore 
does a better job of serving subjectivist values than its strict subjectivist 
counterpart. 
Finally, the attenuated subjectivist approach is immune to one of the 
more important criticisms of subjectivism. Brudner notes that subjectiv-
ism’s focus on the defendant’s mental state is often criticized for being 
overly atomistic and for overlooking “the interpersonal meaning of [the 
defendant’s] act”.82 Strict subjectivism is vulnerable to this criticism be-
cause it focuses exclusively on the defendant’s mental state without regard 
to the social values and expectations that motivate the criminal justice sys-
tem in the first place.83 In contrast, attenuated subjectivism leaves some 
                                                                                                             
81 Id., at 30. 
82 Alan Brudner, “Subjective Fault for Crime: A Reinterpretation” (2008) 14 Legal Theory 1, 
at 20. Brudner presents an alternative account of subjectivism, one that also avoids this common criticism. 
83 As Brudner notes, “a public standpoint [in contrast with individual perspectives] is 
required to make law, crime, and punishment conceivable”: id., at note 25.  
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space for contextual considerations by making blameworthiness a function 
of both the defendant’s mental state and social norms: the defendant’s 
mental state is central to an assessment of what she could have done, while 
social norms are relevant to an assessment of what she should have done.  
Michael S. Moore’s analysis of the “choice” theory of excuses helps 
clarify the role of social norms within the attenuated subjectivist  
approach.84 According to the “choice” theory of excuses, criminal law doc-
trines like duress, necessity and provocation excuse wrongful acts on the 
grounds that the actors did not have the capacity or the opportunity to make 
a choice to do otherwise.85 Moore argues that, to understand this theory, we 
must read the sentence “‘he could have done otherwise’ [as] elliptical for 
‘he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to’”.86 A person “could 
have done otherwise if he had chosen to” in circumstances where his choice 
“was not made impossible by factors over which he had no control” (e.g., a 
sudden coronary) and “was not made very difficult by factors over which he 
had no control” (e.g., a knife pressed to his throat).87 The question, of 
course, is what makes choices impossible or very difficult. Moore reduces 
this question to two sub-issues.88 The first “relates to the equipment of the 
actor: does he have sufficient choosing capacity to be responsible?”89 The 
second “relates to the situation in which the actor finds himself: does that 
situation present him with a fair chance to use his capacities for choice so as 
to give effect to his decision?”90  
My account of the attenuated subjectivist approach maps neatly onto 
Moore’s analysis. First, to say “she could have acted differently” is to say 
compliance with the law was not made impossible by factors over which 
she had no control. To assess this criterion, we ask whether the actor had 
sufficient choosing capacity to be responsible. This assessment is rela-
tively straightforward since the doctrines of legal capacity and physical 
involuntariness indicate whether or not the actor had sufficient choosing 
capacity to be responsible.  
Second, to say “she should have acted differently” is to say she had a 
fair chance to use her choosing capacities. To assess this criterion, we ask 
whether factors over which she had no control made it very difficult for 
                                                                                                             
84 Michael S. Moore, “Choice, Character and Excuse” (1990) 7 Social Philosophy & Policy 29.  
85 Id., at 29. 
86 Id., at 35. 
87 Id.  
88 Id., citing Hart, supra, note 12 (emphasis in original). 
89 Id., at 35. 
90 Id. 
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her to comply. This assessment is more challenging. When do factors 
outside the actor’s control make it “very difficult” for her to comply with 
the law? To address this question, Moore contrasts a person who com-
mits a wrongful act after being threatened with a person who commits 
the same act out of animus. Both may feel her emotions make it very dif-
ficult for her to comply with the law, but only the former has an 
acceptable excuse. Moore therefore concludes that a person who per-
ceives that he or she has a hard choice to make may still have a fair 
opportunity. Fair opportunity is “not measured by [a person’s] psycho-
logical difficulties, but rather by the objective facts of the matter”.91 It is 
measured by social norms about when someone has a fair opportunity to 
make a choice. Again, the attenuated subjectivist approach incorporates 
these norms into its assessment of when someone “should” have done 
differently. 
4. The Limits of Attenuated Subjectivism 
The criminal justice system is designed to promote community val-
ues and welfare. By incorporating social norms into the fault assessment 
in the manner described above, the attenuated subjectivist approach 
serves this intent. At the same time, however, the approach’s attention to 
community norms gives rise to a major difficulty. Standards and norms 
about blameworthiness are evolving and contested. Thus, to assess 
whether a given objective mens rea offence is acceptable under the at-
tenuated subjectivist approach, we must beg the essential normative 
question: When is it fair to say someone should have done otherwise? 
When does someone have a fair opportunity to comply with the law? In 
this light, the attenuated subjectivist approach appears to be an empty 
vessel. 
Despite this major limitation, I think the attenuated subjectivist ap-
proach stands as a prima facie justification for one species of negligence-
based crimes: crimes that occur in the context of licensed activities such 
as dangerous driving or the careless storage of a firearm. The licensing 
requirement creates a presumption that defendants can and should dem-
onstrate the requisite standard of care, thereby bypassing debates about 
fairness and blameworthiness. Justice Charron’s Beatty analysis reveals 
why. I turn to that judgment now. 
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V. GUIDANCE FROM JUSTICE CHARRON’S R. V. BEATTY JUDGMENT 
1. Guidance on the Modified Objective Test 
Beatty was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle 
causing death after he drove into oncoming traffic and collided with an-
other vehicle, killing its three occupants. The trial judge acquitted him, 
but the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial after find-
ing the trial judge had misapplied the modified objective test. Justice 
Charron restated that test and restored Beatty’s acquittal. In this subsec-
tion, I will briefly review her restatement of the test by way of 
background before returning to the issue of attenuated subjectivism. 
Justice Charron explained that the modified objective test “modifies” 
the ordinary civil negligence test in two respects. First, there must be a 
marked departure from the standard of care (not a mere departure, as for 
civil negligence). Second, the fault analysis can include some considera-
tion of the accused’s actual mental state.92  
To explain the first modification, the requirement of a marked depar-
ture, Charron J. cited a passage from Cory J.’s Hundal reasons in which 
he described driving as an “activity that is primarily reactive and not con-
templative”.93 For Cory J., this description justified applying an objective 
mens rea standard to driving offences. Because driving is “automatic and 
reflexive”, we cannot meaningfully assess a person’s subjective intent with 
respect to her driving, nor would it make sense to acquit her on the grounds 
that she did not explicitly decide to drive dangerously.94 Justice Charron 
affirmed this analysis but probed it more deeply. She concluded the rou-
tine nature of driving cuts both ways: it requires an objective mens rea 
standard, but one that is not set too low: 
Because driving, in large part, is automatic and reflexive, some 
departures from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person 
will inevitably be the product, as Cory J. states, of “little conscious 
thought”. … The fact that the danger may be the product of little 
conscious thought becomes of concern because, as McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) aptly put it in [Creighton]: “The law does not lightly brand a 
person as a criminal”.95 
                                                                                                             
92 Beatty, supra, note 9, at para. 7. 
93 Hundal, supra, note 19, at 884-85, quoted in Beatty, id., at para. 33. 
94 Hundal, id., at 884. 
95 Beatty, supra, note 9, at para. 34. 
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Virtually all drivers succumb to occasional momentary lapses of at-
tention. If every lapse entailed criminal liability, we would criminalize 
many instances of commonplace behaviour. Justice Charron cautioned 
against over-criminalization and explained that the need to restrain the 
scope of the criminal law justifies the requirement of a marked departure 
from the standard of care: criminal liability must be more limited than 
civil liability lest we risk “violating the principle of fundamental justice 
that the morally innocent not be deprived of liberty”.96  
Justice Charron went on to explain the second Hundal modification, 
the limited consideration of the accused’s actual mental state.97 As we 
have seen, Hundal said personal characteristics short of incapacity may 
inform the application of the modified objective test, while Creighton 
deemed them to be irrelevant.98 Following these decisions, courts 
struggled with how to approach evidence of the accused’s mental state.99 
Justice Charron clarified matters by delineating the actus reus and mens 
rea requirements for dangerous driving. The actus reus is set by the 
statute, which prohibits driving in a manner “dangerous to the public, 
having regard to all the circumstances ...”.100 The mens rea is a “marked 
departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the accused’s circumstances”.101 The accused’s actual state of 
mind may be relevant to this analysis in three ways. First, it could satisfy 
the mens rea requirement. For example, a driver who intentionally 
endangers others thereby departs markedly from the standard of care.102 
Second, it is relevant to some defences, such as mistake of fact.103 Third, 
certain aspects of the driver’s subjective experience — for example, a 
detached retina — can inform the objective inquiry.104 This latter point 
explains how Hundal and Creighton sit together. Personal factors, in the 
sense of attributes or abilities, are immaterial to the standard of care 
itself. We do not ask what a reasonable person like the accused would 
have done. That standard is, however, applied in context, and the context 
may include subjective experiences particular to the accused, such as a 
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detached retina. We ask what a reasonable person in the accused’s 
circumstances would have done.105 
Justice Charron’s approach to delineating the actus reus and mens 
rea for dangerous driving “sought to ensure that a meaningful analysis of 
both elements would be performed in every case” and addressed the lin-
gering concern that Hundal “did not sufficiently emphasize the 
importance of giving careful attention to the fault requirement of danger-
ous driving”.106 Her careful attention to the fault requirement, together 
with her explicit concerns about over-criminalization, suggests a subjec-
tivist orientation. Yet, she accepted the modified objective test for 
dangerous driving — a seemingly contextualist manoeuvre. Any appar-
ent tension is resolved, however, if we read her judgment as an example 
of the attenuated subjectivist approach.  
2. Guidance on the Attenuated Subjectivist Approach 
In his Hundal reasons, Cory J. discussed the licensing requirement 
for driving, noting that the “minimum standard of physical and mental 
well-being coupled with the basic knowledge of the standard of care 
                                                                                                             
105 Some of the confusion surrounding the modified objective test comes, I think, from Cory J.’s 
use of the term “personal factors” to describe experiences like medical emergencies. These 
experiences are indeed personal in the sense that they are particular to the individual, but they are not 
an aspect of personality. Justice Cory would have done better, I think, to refer to “individual 
context” as opposed to “personal factors”.  
106 R. v. Roy, [2012] S.C.J. No. 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice 
McLachlin, concurring in Beatty, would have defined the actus reus and mens rea elements 
differently. In her view, the actus reus for dangerous driving is a marked departure from the normal 
manner of driving. The mens rea can be inferred from the actus reus, though evidence might 
undermine this inference: supra, note 9, at para. 67. Hamish Stewart prefers McLachlin C.J.C.’s 
approach: Hamish Stewart, “Beatty: Towards a Coherent Law of Penal Negligence” (2008) 54 C.R. 
(6th) 45, at 54. In his view, behaviour constituting a marked departure from the normal manner of 
driving is an aspect of conduct. It should therefore be classified as an actus reus requirement, per 
McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach, and not as a mens rea requirement as in Charron J.’s schema: “For, to 
characterize an aspect of conduct as a fault [i.e. mens rea] element runs the risk of imposing liability 
without fault, that is, the risk that triers of fact will convict on the basis of conduct alone”: id., at 52. 
In other words, Stewart is concerned that if conduct alone can satisfy the mens rea requirement, we 
might wind up convicting people who perform harmful actions in the absence of a blameworthy 
mental state. I share Stewart’s concern about the risk of imposing liability without fault, but I think 
McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach is more likely to lead to this result because it allows the mens rea to be 
inferred from the actus reus. Though McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach categorizes all conduct as actus 
reus, it does so at the expense of maintaining a distinct mens rea analysis. In contrast, by identifying 
the marked departure standard as the mens rea element, Charron J. affirmed that even objective mens 
rea offences require separate, substantive mens rea analyses. I think her insistence on a distinct mens 
rea analysis ultimately does more to ensure the fault requirement will be taken seriously. 
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required of licensed drivers obviate” the need for a court to establish that 
“the particular accused intended or was aware of the consequences of his 
or her driving”.107 Justice Charron took up this observation and used it to 
ground her fault analysis. She explained that the licensing requirement is 
significant for two reasons.  
First, because driving is a licensed activity, we can generally assume 
drivers are capable of meeting the requisite standard of care.108 In other 
words, we can fairly presume a driver could have met the standard.  
Second, because drivers choose to engage in a voluntary, regulated, in-
herently dangerous activity, a driver who fails to meet the requisite 
standard “cannot be said to be morally innocent”.109 The driver is pre-
sumptively aware of the standard of care and is on notice it will be 
enforced. Justice Charron therefore concluded that fault “can be based on 
the voluntary undertaking of the activity, the presumed capacity to 
properly do so, and the failure to meet the requisite standard of care”.110 
In other words, she found the fault requirement can be met because, by 
virtue of the licensing requirement, the driver presumptively could and 
should have met the standard of care.  
By grounding the fault requirement on the driver’s presumptive ca-
pacity and the widely held expectation of compliance, both of which are 
entailed by the licensing requirement, Charron J. modelled the attenuated 
subjectivist approach. Beatty thus stands as a helpful illustration of how 
this approach can apply in the licensing context without resort to contro-
versial propositions about blameworthiness and fairness. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
According to strict subjectivists, subjectivism is inherently incompatible 
with objective mens rea offences. The attenuated subjectivist account is 
more nuanced. It does not view every objective mens rea offence as a prima 
facie violation of subjectivist principles. Whereas strict subjectivists believe 
an actor is only blameworthy if she deliberately chooses to perform a 
prohibited act, attenuated subjectivists blame her if her actions reflect her 
moral agency; that is, if she could and should have done differently. On this 
latter view, some negligent actors are blameworthy because in some 
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circumstances we can fairly say that they could and should have done 
differently. The challenge, of course, is identifying those circumstances. 
One important set of circumstances in which the attenuated subjec-
tivist approach applies is the licensing context. For the reasons developed 
by Charron J. in Beatty, that context entitles us to presume the defendant 
could and should have met the standard of care. It thereby allows us to 
apply the attenuated subjectivist analysis without engaging in debates 
about when someone has the capacity and the fair opportunity to comply 
with the law.  
In all other cases, the attenuated subjectivist approach helps us frame 
the discussion by shifting the focus away from whether there was a de-
liberate choice to cause or risk harm towards a more expansive analysis 
of blameworthiness. Where that analysis cannot be grounded in stable 
premises, such as those provided by the licensing context, I think we 
should err on the side of presuming that objective mens rea offences in-
fringe section 7. As noted above, I agree with Roach that the government 
should then have the opportunity to justify such offences under section 1. 
My proposed approach thus encourages a multifaceted analysis of 
blameworthiness; one that places the burden on the government to justify 
objective mens rea offences except in clear cases of presumptive blame-
worthiness like those situated in the licensing context. This approach is 
more nuanced than the other two approaches. Contextualism focuses on 
policy considerations without sufficient regard to the defendant’s mental 
state. Strict subjectivism truncates and abstracts the fault analysis by fix-
ating on the issue of deliberate choice. 
As a matter of practice, of course, the Court has not restricted objec-
tive mens rea offences to the licensing context,111 nor has it applied 
sections 7 and 1 in the manner suggested by Roach. Indeed, its objective 
mens rea case law is hard to reconcile from any theoretical perspective. 
Yet, although the case law is challenging and the scholarly debates seem 
intractable, the objective mens rea issue merits our ongoing attention. 
The Court and scholars of all stripes agree that criminal punishment must 
be justified by fault. This insistence on fault aims “to harmonize notions 
of moral responsibility and criminal liability”.112 It aims to make the 
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criminal justice system recognizable as a justice system. We must there-
fore continue to grapple with the nature of criminal fault, including in the 
challenging context of objective mens rea offences, in an effort to ensure 
that the criminal justice system evolves in a logical, principled manner. 
What is perhaps most notable about Charron J.’s Beatty reasons is that 
she undertook a careful fault analysis in the first place. She could have 
elaborated the modified objective test without re-examining the Hundal 
Court’s rationale for treating dangerous driving as an objective mens rea 
offence. Instead, she grounded her analysis on a careful examination of 
why we punish dangerous driving. In so doing, she demonstrated her 
commitment to ensuring that the criminal law is not only intelligible, but 
also principled and just. Whatever our views on the nature of criminal 
fault, this commitment is one that we can and should admire. 
 
  
